Talking Points on the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

Talking Points on the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal
Background: On July 18, 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh announced a new deal to allow the resumption of full civilian nuclear cooperation between the two countries for the first time since India improperly used U.S. nuclear material for its
1974 bomb test.
Basic Message: Weakening existing U.S. nonproliferation laws in order to facilitate the US-Indian nuclear deal will have negative security impacts for the United States and will undermine global nonproliferation efforts.
Specific Points of Concern:
􀃆 The U.S. should strengthen ties with India through expanded cooperation in trade and human
development, scientific and medical research, energy technology, and humanitarian relief, but the U.S. should NOT expand nuclear cooperation with any state if it comes at the expense of efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons.
􀃆 If the deal is approved in its current form by Congress and the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, it could severely damage the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the nonproliferation regime. India has refused to sign the NPT, has detonated nuclear bombs, and refuses to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards over all of its nuclear facilities.
􀃆 India refuses to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and stop the production of fissile material for its expanding nuclear arsenal.
􀃆 Due to its history of non-cooperation with international protocols on nonproliferation, India does not qualify for full civil nuclear cooperation under existing U.S. laws and global nuclear export regulations.
􀃆 Even if India agrees to meaningful safeguards on its “civilian” facilities, U.S. nuclear aid would free up India’s existing capacity to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons. According to Indian nuclear hawk K. Subrahmanhyan, in order to expand India’s nuclear arsenal, it should “categorize as many reactors as possible as civilian” to facilitate foreign refueling and conserve India’s scarce “native uranium fuel for weapons-grade plutonium production.”
Oppose the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal: Organize Support for H.Con.Res. 318
On December 15, 2005, Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA) and Congressman Fred Upton (R-MI) introduced H. Con. Res. 318 in the House of Representatives. H. Con. Res. 318 “expresses concern regarding nuclear proliferation with respect to proposed full civilian nuclear cooperation with India, and for other purposes.”
This legislation will compel the United States to consistently fulfill its obligations under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The legislation will also allow the United States to demonstrate its ongoing commitment to global non-proliferation and to conserve positive international relations with states currently party to and complying with the rules of the NPT.
Among other measures, H.Con.Res. 318 calls for:
• Congress to express concern over the possibility that the supply of nuclear fuel to India could
result in the capacity for India to produce fissile material for weapons purposes, and thus
compromise the ability for the US to comply with Article 1 of the NPT;
• the US to support efforts by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to make full-scope safeguards a
necessary condition for the export of nuclear materials to non-nuclear-weapon states;
• recognition that the proposal for full nuclear cooperation between the United States and India
poses far-reaching and adverse implications for US nuclear nonproliferation objectives, and will
do little for long-term Indian alignment with US strategic objectives;
• the strengthening of ties between the United States and India through means such as trade,
scientific research and humanitarian relief rather than through the trade in nuclear materials;
• the US to recognize the importance to world security of ceasing the production of fissile
materials for weapons purposes;
• the Congress to recognize the common interest held by both the United States and India in
reducing the global threat of nuclear weapons through nonproliferation; and
• the US to disapprove of proposals for the export of nuclear materials to any country that is not
a party to the NPT and has detonated a nuclear weapon, or is a non-nuclear-weapon state
under the NPT but has not accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards over its nuclear facilities.